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ARTICLE
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE
NATIONALITY OF JUDGES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Manfred Lachst
It is a truism to repeat that courts constitute a very important institution in all societies. They have been part and parcel
of them from time immemorial, from the individual judge to the
bench. Hence, whatever stage of history we look at, we find that
courts were under the protection of the rulers and, with the passage of time, acquired the confidence, approval and support of
t Manfred Lachs was a member of the International Court of Justice from 1967
until his death earlier this year. He was born in Poland in 1914 and received Juris Doctor and Master of Laws degrees from the University of Cracow, a Docteur en Droit degree from the University of Nancy, France, and a DSC (Law) from the University of
Moscow. He also received nineteen honorary degrees, four of them from universities in
the United States.
During World War II, Judge Lachs served in the Polish Forces in the United Kingdom. He was later attached to the United Nations War Crimes Commission, and he prepared the Polish indictment for the Nuremburg Trials. He was legal adviser to Poland's
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was one of the designers of the plan for a nuclear free
zone in Europe.
With the United Nations, Judge Lachs represented Poland in the General Assembly.
He was elected Chairman of the Legal Committee an unprecedented three times in 1949,
1951 and 1955, and he was chairman of the United Nations Legal Sub-committee for the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space from 1961 to 1966. On the International Court of Justice,
Judge Lachs was President from 1973 to 1976, and he was serving in an unprecedented
third term at the time of his death on January 14, 1993.
Judge Lachs' publications include more than one hundred articles and books in
seven languages. They include WAR CRIMES: AN ATTEMPT TO DEFINE THE ISSUES (1945);
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW MAKING
THE TEACHER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1982). Among his awards were the

(1972); and
Andrew G.

Haley Award of the International Astronautical Federation and the International Institute of Space Law (1963) and the organizations' Gold Medal (1966); the World Jurist
Award (1975); the Grotius Medal (1984); the Copernicus Medal (1984); and the Encyclopedia Britannica Laureate Award (1987).
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the people. Once courts appeared in the international arena the
problem of acceptance became more complex, for then the issue
arose of courts being entrusted with disputes between states.
Thus the composition of international courts became of paramount importance. In view of the fragility of the international
judiciary in the early stages of its development, this has been
true especially of the International Court of Justice. The law in
this respect is articulated by Articles 2 and 9 of the Statute of
that Court. There is no need to recall that these articles are mutually complementary: while Article 2 speaks of the individual in
question, Article 9 speaks of the Court as a whole. In view of the
topicality of the issue and frequent references to it in recent
years, I think some observations may be timely.
It may perhaps be useful to begin with an analysis of the
provisions concerning the Court as a whole. Article 9 calls upon
the electors to "bear in mind not only that the persons to be
elected should individually possess the qualifications required,
but also that in the body as a whole the representation of the
main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of
the world should be assured." Comments on this provision vary.
Some have taken the line that "its 'real' effect is to postulate the
political factor in the distribution of places on the Court, and in
particular that the permanent members of the Security Council
will have judges of their nationality on the Court."1 It has also
been suggested that the provisions of Article 2 concerning individual qualifications and Article 9 "might be found to be contradictory"2 ; I wonder whether this, as a general proposition, is really so. One has of course to bear in mind that if provisions
concerning the individual qualifications of candidates remained
the exclusive criterion one might, in some circumstances, arrive
at results in which some "legal systems," in view of their high
level of development of international law in both theory and
practice, became predominant on the bench. Thus some groups
of states which are also very much advanced in science, technol-

' SHABTAI ROSENNE, 1 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 168
(1965). Rosenne likewise describes it as "a more refined version of other provisions of the
Charter concerning the principle of what is called 'equitable geographical distribution' as
a guide to the composition of various other organs of the United Nations." Id.
2

Id.
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ogy and other spheres would displace other nations. Should this
happen, the Court would not be representative of the international community at the given stage of history. Now the other
condition concerning the Court as a whole is "representation of
the main forms of civilization." An important issue arises as to
the meaning of that term. It would seem to require the identification of certain states as representing these main forms of civilization. Broadly speaking, one could include "Western" civilization; one could also include some civilizations of the East which
have a very long and glorious history, from the Mediterranean to
the Pacific. Some civilizations are said to have existed in Africa
for centuries until they disappeared. As to Africa, it is difficult
to expunge from one's mind the claim of some writers that it
would not - in the words of one of them - be useful to study
" 'the unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque
but irrelevant corners of the globe.' ",3 In the western hemisphere, also, some elaborate civilizations have disappeared as a
consequence of European conquest, while the nations that supplanted them have become representative of European civilization, as reflected in their society and development. There are of
course also civilizations, some in the Middle and Far East, which
have retained their impact on the lives of the peoples concerned
and, though having changed considerably, retain a pronounced
identity. One need not necessarily follow Arnold Toynbee to discuss them in historical perspectives and seek to establish a dialogue between them. We certainly live in a world of many civilizations and an advocate of this plurality claims: "qu'on ne peut
pas plus enfermer le monde dans un systeme qu'expliquer Bach
par les mots."
The notion of "civilization" in the Statute has to be linked
with the other notion: "the principal legal systems of the world."
Here again we face a serious problem. It has been suggested by
an authority on the subject that the idea of the representation of
the principal legal systems of the world is equivocal and was included as the result of a misunderstanding.4 Certainly there may
MANFRED LACHS, THE TEACHER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (2d ed. 1987).
' L'id~e de representation des 'principaux syst~mes de droit' semble reposer sur
une 6quivoque ou sur un malentendu. Ilest sans doute tr~s utile que les juges, ou
au moins quelques-uns d'entre eux en litige. En redigeant l'art. 9 original, on a
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be some difficulties in identifying these institutions if one is to
concentrate on the contemporary scene. However, it should not
be forgotten that, in a historical perspective, there have been
many legal systems. Here the easiest approach is to call on the
evidence of an authority like John Henry Wigmore.5 A historical
analysis of legal systems is a fascinating enterprise.' It remains a
fact that Roman law has survived and has been incorporated
into a series of legal systems.' However, if we turn to our contemporary world, we find in it two dominant systems, the so
called "continental" and the "Anglo-Saxon" - in brief, the law
derived from principles of the Roman system and the Common
Law. These two systems more or less dominate the landscape.
However, sight should not be lost of some other systems influencing the situation in many parts of the world, like Islamic law
or tribal law in Africa, Buddhist law in Asia, some traces of

probablement pense a la coexistence p.ex. du droit anglo-saxon et du droit continental europeen, mais la Cour doit juger d'apres le droit international que est le
meme pour toutes les parties ...
M. Huber, Etude des amendements & apporter au Statut de la Cour internationale de
Justice (Vingt-deuxi~me Commission), 1 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 407, 414 (1954), quoting Sir ALFRED ZIMMERN, THE AMERICAN ROAD TO WORLD
PEACE 95-96 (1953).
6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,

A

PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS,

(1936). Rely-

ing on his testimony one has to admit that "the oldest have long disappeared." However,
some remain:
[T]he Anglican, the Romanesque and the Mohammedan, which are amongst
the most youthful, today cover the greater part of the world's population. The
Egyptian and the Mesopotamian, the oldest, have long disappeared. The Hindu
survives tolerance under another dominant political system... And the story of
Europe since the Christian era can best be told by describing first the Keltic,
Slavic and Germanic systems, and then turning back to the beginning of the maritime and Church systems, whose records far antedate those of the other three.
Id. at 4-6.
" As Wigmore describes, proceedings in Egyptian courts were conducted "'without
any speeches from advocates... For they believe that from speeches of advocates much
clouding of the legal issues would result; the cleverness of the speakers, the spell of their
delivery, the tears of the accused, influence many persons to ignore the strict rules of law
and the standards of truth.'" Id. at 31-32. He adds: "But today the Pyramids and the
pictographs and the papyri are the only sure symbols of the native Egyptian institutions
of six thousand years ago." Id. at 50.
' A reference may also be made to the Japanese legal system, to Mohammedan law,
or to the Slavic system. Id. at 461-483, 535-639, and 735. Wigmore would have us conclude that there have been sixteen legal systems in world history, and he asks: "What
gives rise to a legal system, what controls its destiny? What becomes of the specific institutions: property, contract, testament within each system?" Id. at 1119.
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which are still to be found. However, the essential question
which touches us here is: To what extent have these systems an
influence on international law - in particular, an influence on
the decision-making functions of the International Court of Justice? For this is surely the touchstone. Under the circumstances,
I would not go so far as to find that these criteria may be considered equivocal or "contradictory".'
It would be useful to ascertain to what extent systems other
than those mentioned have had an influence on the development
of international law and its contemporary institutions. For the
purposes of our analysis I think it may suffice to say that peoples of Africa and Asia, while sharing the generally recognized
principles of international law and its development and having
taken part in its recent codification, have accepted international
law as a whole. However they have influenced it, so their acceptance is not merely passive. Whether their influence has a specific
origin, such as a particular legal system, remains to be seen. If
we look at the development or birth of many new states, we will
find that their internal legal systems have retained some features of their native cultures and development, but that in international relations they have in fact accepted those principles of
law which have been generally recognized. Thus, to give due attention to the provisions of Article 9, adequate consideration of
this phenomenon is required. It is suggested that the concept
may be close or similar to what was called "equitable geographical distribution" but is not identical with it. Nor could I possibly
agree with the claim that the retention of the provision in 194546 was intended to assure a seat on the Court to all permanent
members of the Security Council in the new Organization.'
However that may be, in its practical application, the provision in question should secure the "representation" of groups of
states which originally did not constitute a part of the European
system of the law of nations but have since been drawn within or
acceded to it and at the same time have been affecting its development. In brief, it should include "representatives" of many

' SHABTAI ROSENNE, 1 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

168 n.1-

2 (1965).
1 Id. at 168.
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races, colors of skin and continents.'0
This has been reflected in the composition of the Court
since 1946, in the sense that the "mix" of nationalities has
changed almost pari passu with the expansion of United Nations membership. In its cradle, when there were but fifty-one of
the United Nations, Europe had in fact six seats (France, the
United Kingdom, Belgium, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia). In
addition, there was a judge from the Soviet Union. As a result of
formal understandings followed from the outset, nationals of the
five "great powers" have been sitting on the bench ever since,
with an intermission of eighteen years (1967-1985) in the case of
China." (Now the seat formerly reserved for the Soviet Union is
occupied by a judge from Russia). With the expansion of United
Nations membership, the representation of Europe has declined:
when Europe lost one seat, the Court was unfortunately deprived of one of its most outstanding jurists, Charles De Visscher, who failed to gain re-election in 1951.
Originally, within the framework of fifty-one United Nations members, Asia had only one seat, and that was the seat of
a judge of the nationality of a great power, China. Later there
were judges from India, Pakistan, or, as now, Sri Lanka, joined
by Japan. Thus today one can say that the legal systems and
civilizations of Asia (excluding Arab countries) have three seats,
including one national of a great power. The Court has always
had one Arab judge, whether from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria or as now - Algeria. The last-mentioned judge may rightly also be
viewed as coming from Africa, like the Egyptian judge in earlier
times. In fact the first Egyptian judge was for some years the
only Member of the Court from Africa. Successive judges from
Senegal and Nigeria have sat on the bench since the mid-1960's
with, for some time, one from Benin, but last year a judge from
Madagascar replaced the Senegalese. One may say that the present situation symbolizes the idea that Africa, like Asia, ought
not to have less than three seats, though one of them may over-

10

I put derivatives of "represent" in quotes because, of course, there can be no valid

argument to suggest that these "independent magistrates" are elected to "represent" the
political interests of any group.
" Following the change in China's representation at the United Nations (1971), no
Chinese candidature was presented until the 1984 elections to the bench.
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lap with representation of the Arab world. The fruitful divide
between anglophone (Common Law) and francophone (Continental Law) African countries is also reflected in the composition of the Court. On the other side of the Atlantic, North and
South America, the Western Hemisphere, had in 1946 six seats:
one was occupied by a national of the United States, which has
retained a seat ever since; another by a Canadian and four by
Latin Americans. This figure of four was gradually reduced when
seats were taken by nationals of Asia and Africa, and today
South America and Central America have together two seats.
One can no longer say Latin America because, while one of them
is that of a judge from Venezuela, the other is occupied by a
judge from Guyana, which, as a former British colony, certainly
represents a different legal system.
Reverting to the text which has given rise to this geographical excursion, "the principal legal systems of the world," one
may note that many distinguished jurists who served on the
Court in the course of the last forty-six years and originated
from Asia and Africa - at least to a large extent - were educated in Common Law countries. This was the case for Judges
Zafrullah Khan, A. El-Erian, Nagendra Singh, C.D. Onyeama,
R.S. Pathak, Sir Benegal Rau, V.K. Wellington Koo, S. Oda, M.
Shahabuddeen, Ni Zhengyu, C.G. Weeramantry and T.O. Elias.
Others from those continents were educated under the continental system, mostly in France: e.g., F. Ammoun, A.H. Badawi, A.
El-Khani, L. Ignacio-Pinto, K. Mbaye, R. Ranjeva, and M.
Bedjaoui. Some, like Judge K. Tanaka, were under the influence
of the German school of law. All judges originating from Latin
America were certainly under the influence of the Roman and
civil law system, having a very old tradition dating back to the
days of the school of Salamanca.
I turn now to the requirements laid down by Article 2 of the
Statute. This refers to the composition of the Court as "a body
of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality,"
the further requirements consisting of "high moral character"
and possession Of "qualifications required in their respective
countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices" or of
being "jurisconsults of recognized competence in international
law."
I deal first with the personal qualifications. "High moral
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character" - this is a qualification which obviously may be present everywhere; no country could be held not to produce persons possessing this attribute. One writer has suggested that the
terms "high moral character" and "qualifications required . . .
for appointment to the highest judicial offices" were "probably
the equivalent of an unimpeachable conduct as a public figure;
in other words the candidate need not be an angel, though he
must not be only a little better than a rascal."' 2 It is very difficult to agree with this qualification in view of its equivocal character. "High moral character" is "a high" requirement; one need
not go any further. It certainly implies "moral virtues" defined,
following Aristotle, as "the habitual control of conduct by rational principle; as distinct from the intellectual virtues whose
end is the knowledge of principles."'" Obviously no knowledge is
involved, and no intellectual criteria but such as frequently are
viewed as equivalent to "ethics". Thus the office would be inaccessible to persons whose objectivity or impartiality is likely to
be influenced by the prospect of material gain or other personal
advantages. The message the words convey is quite clear.
The second element concerns the qualifications required for
the highest judicial offices. This is a clear reference to the bench
of supreme courts, high courts of appeal, constitutional courts
and the like. In fact the Court has counted among its Members
personalities having actually held such offices.' 4 The alternative
qualification provided for is that of being jurisconsults "of recognized competence in international law." The term jurisconsults
is frequently understood as indicating legal advisers in ministries of foreign affairs, and this has been the understanding
throughout the years, resulting in the election of many former
legal advisers, to mention only A.H. Badawi, J. Basdevant, Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice, A. Gros, G.H. Hackworth, G. Ladreit de
Lacharri~re, S. Petr~n, and J.E. Read. But the term is also allowed to cover distinguished teachers of international law. It has
1
Taslim 0. Elias, Does the International Court of Justice, as It is Presently
Shaped, Correspond to the Requirements which Follow from Its Functions as the Central Judicial body of the International Community? Judicial Settlement of International
Disputes 21-22 (1974).
DAGOBERT D. RUNES, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 202 (1983).
"
E.g., Judges L. Ignacio-Pinto, H. Klaestad, K. Mbaye, C.D. Onyeama, R.S.
Pathak, K. Tanaka, I. Forster and T.O. Elias.
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been suggested that "the use of the term is something of an
anachronism, we can only understand it in this context and not
in the pristine Roman law usage, but in the general sense of a
jurist, specialist in international law."15 It is rather difficult to
accept the first part of this suggestion. The term is not an
"anachronism," as advisers to the French foreign ministry have
the title of jurisconsultes, and the English word in the Statute
must be deemed equivalent to the no-less-official French homonym. But one can read it as conveying in either language the
much more extensive definition which enables the Court to draw
on leading talents in the academic world: outstanding teachers
of international law, persons who have an important record both
in university activity and in writings. 6 Thus eminent teachers of
international law have adorned the bench of the International
Court of Justice, for example, Charles De Visscher, P.C. Jessup,
E. Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, V.M. Koretsky, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Sir Arnold McNair, H. Mosler, Sir Humphrey Waldock or
B. Winiarski, not to mention the outstanding teachers at present
on the bench. In some cases, e.g., J. Basdevant, R.R. Baxter, and
J. Spiropoulos, they have combined both careers, having been
both teachers and legal advisers. Others who were outstanding
teachers, such as A. Alvarez, F. Ammoun, J.M. Ruda, had diplomatic careers as well. Others held high offices and in their own
countries. Some, like R.J. Alfaro or J.L. Bustamante y Rivero,
were presidents of the nation, others members of government,
such as L. Padilla Nervo or V.K. Wellington Koo. Neither must
one overlook the important fact that several members of the
Court, as specialists or professors of international law, have ac-

'B
10

Elias, supra note 12, at 22.
As I pointed out elsewhere:

Even more significant has been the frequent elevation to the bench of those "most
highly qualified publicists." It has now become a long-established practice to elect
them as members of Commissions of Inquiry, Conciliation Commissions, or as arbitrators or members of international courts. Many of them have passed through
all stages. This is an important transition, for as advisers and counsel they remain
within the bounds of their "persuasive" role. However, as judges they acquire decision-making powers if even only ad causum. They assist in the making of case
law. Thus many members of the two International Courts have had behind them
distinguished careers as teachers and writers. This 'personal union' - as it were
- raises a series of interesting issues.
MANFRED LAcHs, THE TEACHER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 205-06 (2d ed., 1987).
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quired extensive experience as advocates before the Court itself
prior to their election to its bench. The enrichment this brings
to the fund of experience available on the bench needs no emphasizing. Thus the composition of the Court is a multicolored
picture reflecting a wealth of personalities.
One could say that the fact of becoming a judge certainly
has a bearing upon one's thinking. Hence the distinction between the two approaches, as I would call them, tends to narrow. 17 "[A]n increasing number of judicial decisions [are]
handed down by courts with many former 'teachers' on the
bench, which are quoted and in time relied upon by other
'teachers'.""8 This interplay is certainly a fascinating phenomenon but obviously belongs to another theme, and I mention it
only incidentally in order to show the mutual interaction between teaching and the judicial function. Some have referred to
what is called "a personal union" between the two.
I turn now to what is the most delicate aspect in the selecting of judges; that is the issue of their "nationality". According
to Article 2, nationality is neither an asset nor a liability, for the
judges have to be elected "regardless of their nationality." The
freedom provided by Article 2 in this respect is subject to the
simple limitation that no two of the fifteen members of the
Court "may be nationals of the same State."1 9
Now the important question is the relationship between Articles 2 and 9. While nationality is of itself no criterion, it has
cast its shadow upon application of Article 9 and thus had an

"
Cf. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND XX (1949), "Much harm is done
by the myth that, merely by putting on a black robe and taking the oath of office as a
judge, a man ceases to be human and strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking machine."
Is LACHS, supra note 3, at 207.
Is Statute of the International Court of Justice [I.C.J. Statute] art. 3, para. 1. The
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice dealt with the issue in a different way and admitted the possibility of more than two Members being nationals of
States which were Members of the League of Nations. However once this happened the
elder kept his seat and the younger disappeared. Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice [P.C.I.J. Statute] art. 4, para. 3. Moreover, according to the present
Statute, nationals of States which are not Members of the United Nations but are parties to the Statute of the Court could be elected. This virtually belongs to the past because we can say that membership of the organization now covers practically all states on
the globe (however it is worth recalling that a distinguished teacher from Switzerland, P.
Guggenheim, was once a candidate to the Court).
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impact on the composition of the Court as a whole.
In this context the first observation to be made concerns
membership on the Court by nationals of those powers which
are permanent members of the Security Council. It is a fact that
such nationals were expected from the outset to be elected to
the Court, so that the powers in question were presumed to permanently have a national on the bench, thus mirroring the situation in the other organ.2" Undoubtedly this ostensible parallelism, accentuated when, by virtue of the General Assembly
Resolution 1991 (XVII), the members of the Council came to
equal in number that of the Court, tends to blur in the public
perception the vital distinction between an organ of which the
members are States, speaking through their mouthpieces, and
another whose members are individuals deciding in accordance
with their private consciences. It nevertheless gives no ground
for supposing a priori that the judges, nationals of the States
concerned, are, any more than their colleagues, delegates of their
countries' governments. If they differ from the latter in any respect, it is simply in the greater assurance of election which they
possessed as candidates.
That said, it is in the second place necessary, before dealing
with the issue of nationality in more specific terms, to confront
the general view that the present system of elections, based on
the mutual impact of Articles 2 and 9 of the Statute, is dominated by "political considerations."2 One writer has claimed
that "So long as political organs are charged with the conduct of
elections, political considerations will prevail" and that the
"proper synthesis between those political considerations and a
duly qualified Court... can only be achieved by adjustments in
the nominating organs, so that the electing bodies can make
their political choice from a panel of duly qualified candidates. '22 Another has proposed that a distribution of seats be
effected by "means of informal allocation among the various regional and basic legal systems of the world prior to the triennial

20

Cf.

ROSENNE,

supra note 1, at 185.

Cf. ROSENNE, supra note 1, at 190. Cf. in particular reports and debates on the
subject by the Institut de Droit International, Annuaire 44, Vol. 2, 1952 and Annuaire
45, Vol. 1, 1954, p. 407. Cf. also Vol. 2 (1954), pp. 60-107 and p. 296.
"2 ROSENNE, supra note 1, at 190.
"
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elections." ' 3 Such a system would not appeal to those scholars
themselves declining in number - who believe that a further
whittling down of the number of judges from western countries
would affect the professional level of the Court and the judicial
value of its decisions, not to mention the respect accorded to the
latter. Here, as in other spheres, a dual antithesis has appeared
over the years: East and West, North and South.2" But an analysis of the participation of judges from Africa and Asia leads to
the conclusion that they themselves have reasoned under the influence of the two leading world legal systems, both phenomena
of the West. As to Judges of Eastern Europe (the former socialist countries), both Judges from Poland studied in the West, one
in France, the other in Austria and England; here too is a mixture of education which reflects the main legal systems of the
world.
The metamorphosis of the Court's membership has been inevitable. It was the consequence of the growth of the United Nations membership from fifty-one to 178. As indicated earlier,
this deprived the Court of some outstanding jurists, from Europe for instance. It also affected some no less outstanding in
other parts of the world. In fact Sir Kenneth Bailey, an eminent
Australian jurist, twice failed to be elected. In the first election,
in 1946, his place was taken by Judge Read of Canada. But the
late Judge Elias made a serious mistake in claiming that the failure of Sir Kenneth Bailey "to secure election in 1966" was
''partly on the ground that he was considered to be narrow and
conservative and partly because he was of the same Australian
nationality as Sir Percy Spender, who had given the decisive
23 Cf. H. Steinberger: The International Court of Justice Report, International Symposium, Max Planck Institute, at 278. However, he is right in recalling that "to exclude
all political considerations from the nomination and election procedure, however, would
be an idle undertaking. This is not even the rule with national supreme courts in States
where the independence and impartiality of judges and courts are deemed of great
value." Id. at 280.
", As Professor Robert Jennings (as he then was) stated:
We used to be told, for instance, that it was because there was a lack of sufficient
common basis between 'East' and 'West'. Now much the same people tell us the
reason is to be found in the divide between 'North' and 'South' but it is the function and the claim of international law precisely to provide legal framework and
with these differences can be comprehended. If we have to wait until the world is
a single like-minded region we shall wait forever.
Cf. Heidelberg Symposium, 1974, Id. at 36.
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casting vote against the complainants [in the South-West Africa
case]." 5 It should be recalled that the seat of the Australian
judge was taken by Judge Onyeama, a Judge from another Commonwealth country, Nigeria, and a colleague of Judge Elias, and
that since Judge Elias announced his candidacy to succeed his
colleague and was elected, it was he who benefited from this
change.
As to the three-year election rule, it has been pointed out
that it contributes to a lack of stability in the Court and has an
undue impact on the elections in that candidates may be selected with a view to individual judges participating in concrete
cases. 6 It has also been alleged that these elections "involve a
good deal of horsetrading at the best of times.""7 According to
that view, certain Western-European candidates stood "a far
better chance of being elected as they had or were thought to
have liberal or progressive views vis-a-vis the problems of 'the
third world'. ' 28 Several elections demonstrate that this has not
been the case. The differing orientation of some of the candidates was no bar to their election or re-election. What is more,
instability has in practice been avoided by the phenomenon of
re-election, so that every three years there tends to be struck a
rough balance between "experience" and "fresh blood". The apprehensions of twenty years ago have fortunately proved to be,
on the whole, unfounded.
Following that parenthesis on the subject of the system of
election, I now return to the more specific issue of nationality as
a political attribute which only the stateless can disclaim.
It is a matter of historical record that nationality was never
raised as an issue during the lifetime of the Permanent Court of
International Justice. A few Judges of European origin were na-

35

Elias, supra note 12, at 26-27. Nobody regrets more than I do, having known Sir

Kenneth for over twenty years and admired his legal standing, that he failed to be
elected.
26 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice: "The Future of International Law", report to LInstitut
de Droit International,1973, Vol. I.
27 See Elias, then-Attorney-General
of Nigeria in his report to the Symposium at
Heidelberg 1974, Id. at 27. This was an observation made much of by the late Professor
Georg Schwarzenberger drawing conclusions which scarcely require refutation, so illfounded was their basis. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, IV INTERNATIONAL LAW As APPLIED
By INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1986).
'0 Elias, supra note 27, at 26.
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tionals of countries which were far from democratic; there were
some from Latin America to whom democracy also was a strange
phenomenon. Then there were a few Judges from Asia as well.
The European judges indeed included some from totalitarian
countries; one of the most distinguished Judges and Presidents
of the Court, Dionisio Anzilotti, was a citizen of fascist Italy and
served at the Court while Italy was allied to Hitler's Germany.
But no one dared to raise the question of impartiality or independence on the basis of nationality, until in 1986 Professor Georg Schwarzenberger had the following to say: "If [the French
and German] judges had not been prepared to perform acts of
conscious or sub-conscious self-co-ordination with the expectations in their own countries, they would have been liable to be
branded as traitors and treated as social outcasts."2 9
Now it is a matter of fact that Judge Weiss in the 1927 Lotus case, while expressing views similar to those of his country's
government, invoked in his dissenting opinion his "conscience as
a jurist and judge ... ."30 As to Judge Anzilotti, one could say
that he voted in accordance with the Italian political position
and not only in the Custom R~gime case.31 But this in no way
detracts from their reputation as outstanding Judges on the
bench.
It is only during the lifetime of the present Court that the
issue has acquired new and unexpected dimensions."2 Judges
originating from specific countries have been singled out for spe-

29

See

SCHWARZENBERGER,

supra note 27, at 246. One may wonder how anyone can

be prepared to perform a sub-conscious act.
3' The Case of the S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A), No.9 49 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Weiss) reprinted in II WORLD COURT REPORTS 1927-1932 20, 57 (Manley 0. Hudson ed., 1969). [hereinafter WORLD COURT REPORTS]. See also MANLEY O. HUDSON, THE
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, 359 (1972).
3' Advisory Opinion No. 20, Customs Regime Between Austria and Germany, 1931
P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 41, at 55, 70 (individual opinion of Judge Anzilotti) (concerning
Protocol of March 19, 1931), reprinted in WORLD COURT REPORTS, supra note 30, at 725,
733.
32 It is worth recalling that another formula was suggested earlier to the effect that
judges be elected "on the exclusive basis of their technical qualifications and their high
moral character". 13 U.N. Doc. 151, IV/1/7, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 470 (1945). See also 14
U.N.C.I.O. at
Jurist 28, G/20, 14 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 249, 252 (1945)
Jurist 25, G/19, 14 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 253 (1945)
Jurist 86, G/73, 14 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 821, 823 (1945).
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cial criticism. Those from newly independent countries were exposed to criticism as they "seemed not to share European values." Well, in some respect that may be true.3 3 However, it is
clear that "[n]o international judges from any civilized legal system could be presumed to believe that the kidnapping of diplomats is, or ought to be, legal."' 34 Special criticism was levelled at
Judges from Eastern Europe; to be more precise, in the first
stages of the Court's history, to Judges from Poland, the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia. And later, after the expiration of the
term of office of the Judge from Yugoslavia, to the two remaining Judges from Eastern Europe. It was suggested that the socalled "Socialist" Judges constituted a group detached from
"their colleagues on the Court. '35 However critical as these views
may have been, it was admitted that the so-called "Socialist
Judges", despite "differences with the majority," had been prepared to make accommodations to the sensibilities of their colleagues. Such concessions, it was reasoned, were necessary in orparticipation by the Socialist
der for there to be any useful
36
Judges in the Court's work.
Before proceeding further, I think a general comment would
be in order. One Member of the Court once stated: "It is inevitable that every one of us in this Court should retain some trace of
his legal education and his former legal activities in his country
of origin." 37 However, Judges of the same nationality and of the
same legal or cultural dimension frequently arrive at opposing
views. One illustration may suffice: The Judgment of the Court
in 1966, in which the Judge from the United States (the late
Philip Jessup) voted with the Judge from the Soviet Union
(Koretsky) against the Judges from the United Kingdom and
France.3 One might wonder, moreover, whether Judges originat-

'" Professor Thomas M. Franck rightly suggested that no one could claim that
judges "from China and Egypt reflected West European values." THOMAS M. FRANCK,
JUDGING THE WORLD COURT 36 (1986).
" Id. at 38.
35 K. Grzybowski, Socialist Judges in the International Court of Justice, 1964

DUKE

L.J., 536 ff.

Id. at 548.
" Judge Levi Carneiro in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J.
i61 (Preliminary Objections).
3" The South West Africa Cases, 1966 I.C.J. at 323 (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.)
(July 18) (dissenting opinion of Judge Jessup).
"
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ing from the same country could in any event be expected regularly to hold similar views, on points of law which would scarcely
have been laid before the Court had they not offered scope for
divergence even between persons of similar training and origin.39
It has been asserted that "one basic principle upon which the
socialist Judges have continually insisted is that of national sovereignty, as both a legal and a political principle. 4 0 This is not
exact and had certainly not proved true so far as the most recent
twenty years are concerned. It is worth recalling that in the Certain Expenses case Judge Winiarski and Judge Basdevant voted
in the same way. 4" It may also be pointed out that Judges Basdevant, Alvarez, Winiarski, Zoricic, De Visscher, Badawi, Pasha
and Krylov appended a joint opinion in the Corfu Channel
case. 42 But the "mix" of authors of that separate opinion dictates how varied their legal education had been and that nationality played not the slightest role in their views. 43 As indicated
above, "[A] judge may share the point of view of his government. This does not, however, necessarily mean that the Judge
votes for his government or for the policy pursued by that government. '44 On the other hand, it is well known that the Judges
sometimes vote contrary to the views held by their governments. 5 Other strange reasons have been advanced against the
Judges of certain nationalities.

39 Since no two Members can have the same nationality, one can only speculate
whether, for example, Judges Hackworth, Jessup and Dillar would all have voted the
same way in a number of cases.
40 See Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950

I.C.J. 96. Grzybowski, supra note 35, at 537.
41 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20).
4 The Corfu Channel Case, 1947-1948 I.C.J. 31 (Mar. 25).
4' The same author insisted that the views of what were called "socialist Judges"
have been subjected to serious criticism. "[Tiheir doctrines seem highly unrealistic."
Grzybowski, supra note 35, at 549.
"

Cf. Edvard Hambro, Some Observations on the I.C.J. After Thirty Years, STUDI
306, 321 (1978).

IN ONORE BI GIORGIo BALLADORE PALLIERI, MILANO

" See Judge Basdevant in The Minquiers and Ecrehos case, 1953 I.C.J. 74; Judge
McNair in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, 1952 I.C.J. 116; Judges McNair, Basdevant
and Hackworth in the Monetary Gold case, 1954 I.C.J. 34-35.
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Their birthplaces

A Judge of Polish nationality was born in that part of Poland which now belongs to the Ukraine (previously the
U.S.S.R.). He was suspected to be of U.S.S.R. nationality.'" The
absurdity of that claim calls for no comment.' 7 Arthur Frank
Burns (Adviser to the President of the United States 1969, President of the Federal Reserve Board 1970-1978, later U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany) was born at the same
place.
2. Friendlinessof judges towards their countries of origin and
countries actually or potentially involved in cases before the
Court
An American professor once testified that Judges coming
"from countries allied to the United States [are] friendly to our
country and perform their judicial functions with competence
and independence.""' Is "friendliness" towards his or another
country any test of a Judge's "independence"? 9 "Right or
wrong, my country" is not a judicial principle and can never be
accepted as such. A Judge, as I have insisted in my writings,
should be "impartial, objective, detached, disinterested and unbiased." An interesting illustration could be developed from recent practice. The relationship between Argentina and the
United Kingdom had suffered serious setbacks a few years ago,
supra note 27, at 295.
His birthplace was situated not very far from that of the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and Sir Louis Namier, the famous British historian.
48 Cf. Richard N. Gardner, U.S. Termination of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
InternationalCourt of Justice,24 COLUM. J. TRANS. L. 421 (1986). The article is a reproduction of his testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, December 4, 1985.
49 Gardner questioned the independence of three Judges, including the Judges from
Poland. Id. at 424. It will be of interest to note that following my request I received the
following clarification:
[AIny testimony given before a Congressional Committee remains nothing more
than the opinion of the witness. The fact of its presentation before the Committee
should in no way be interpreted to mean that the Committee or any member of
the Committee shares that opinion .... I had understood that the Professor was a
scholar of some note. He apparently is ignorant of your professional work, both on
and off Court as well as your reputation among your colleagues. Had he known
these things, he surely would not have said what he did.
46

SCHWARZENBERGER,
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the Falkland conflict having left the two countries on an almost
hostile footing. Could this have had an impact on the capacity of
the Judge from Argentina to sit in a case in which the United
Kingdom was involved? There have been and are still disputes
or less than friendly relations between States whose nationals sit
together on the bench of the International Court of Justice.
There is obviously no relationship between the position of a government vis-a-vis judgments or decisions of the Court and the
position of the Judges as such.50
3. Judges as nationals of States which have not accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
Today, seven Judges are nationals of States which have not
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In the past,
this number was much higher and Poland was in fact one of
those countries. But, as I pointed out elsewhere, Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute is not the only means whereby States may
refer disputes to the Court or be sued before it. There are other
possibilities, such as bilateral agreements."1

4.

'2
"Demanding expectations of Governments

As to Judges from Poland this has not been true. At no time
even after 1946 were nominations by the Polish National Group
5o

Cf. Andre Gros, La Cour Internationalede Justice 1946-1986: Les refiexions

d'un juge, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
SHABTAI ROSENNE 289 ff. (Professor Yoram Dinstein, ed. 1989). Cf. The criticism by the
French Government of the Judgment in the Nuclear Tests cases. Judge Gros himself
warmly congratulated the Polish candidate to the Court in a letter of April 1966, and
later on his election which he described as "brilliant" (November 14, 1966). I would only
add that contrary to his claim the reasons for Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and Philip Jessup
not having been elected to the presidency of the Court in 1967 and 1970 were not identical but were entirely different. Id. at 297.
51 Poland never accepted the compulsory jurisdiction in the inter-war period, yet it
was the most frequent client of the Court. See my comments in Correspondence, 84 AM.
J. INT. L. 23 (1989).
62 Schwarzenberger referred to "the demanding expectations of the U.S.S.R. Government regarding the behaviour of nationals in its client-States whom it has decided
not to veto for nomination for appointment to significant posts in the United Nations
system .... SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 27, at 323. He failed to mention that in 1961
the future judge from Poland was offered the post of Under-Secretary-General for Legal
Affairs by the then Secretary-General. However, the existing government in power
blocked the appointment.
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67

subject to outside approval.
All in all, it may too be pointed out that suppositions as to
the political dependence of Judges under the guise of all sorts of
suspicions concerning their personalities, their alleged ties, and
particularly their nationalities are ill-founded. It is obvious that
some cases arise where a Judge does not live up to legitimate
expectations. As with every important post, mistakes can be
made. However, those mistakes should not be raised to the level
of generalization, whereby underlying principles are stood on
their heads.
Thus it remains particularly improper to disqualify candidates or Judges on account of their nationality. One should
judge the individual on his merits, and on some occasions attacks against the integrity of a Judge have amounted to baseless
insinuations.5" The claim concerning the composition of the
Court as reflecting the national interest of States has never been
substantiated. Among the many Judgments and Advisory Opinions handed down there are certainly some of which invite criticism. But these decisions never reflected national interests related to the nationality of Judges.
The present electoral system, notwithstanding its weaknesses, works relatively well and the composition of the Court is

53 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 158-60 (June 27)
(separate opinion of Judge Lachs). Reply to the Statement of Mr. A. Sofaer. Need I
recall that the Judge from Poland was considered by the NEw YORK TIMES "the strongest new candidate." (N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1966). While the WASHINGTON POST wrote
"among the five judges who were chosen (one third of the total membership) the candidate from Poland appears to be the best qualified." "The other four new judges chosen
are not well known in the field of international law, but only have attained distinction in
the legal or diplomatic circles of their own country." (WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1966). One of
the claims, particularly by G. Schwarzenberger, is absurd. As evidence of "subservience"
he referred to the congratulations offered by the then President of the Security Council
who was a representative of the then USSR. He admitted later that he failed to mention
that the first to be congratulated was the Ambassador of Japan, in view of the election of
a judge from Japan.
It may be of interest to recall that in the Hostages in Tehran case the Agent of the
Applicant Government did not object to the presence of "the Warsaw Pact judge" but
relied on his views. He stated: "Perhaps the best way for me to conclude my discussion
of the commission is to quote from Judge Lachs' opinion in the Aegean Sea Continental
Shelf case . . . [he] used language which to my mind precisely fits the crisis in the
United States-Iranian relations since 4 November. . ." Cf. Pleadings, Oral Arguments,
Documents, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, at
272.
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well-balanced. The notion of "communist" or "Warsaw Pact"
Judges is a product of a certain stage of history. It was artificial
and harmful and it has done a lot of damage. Now it belongs to
history. That "species" has never existed; its invention was an
attempt at an all-too-easy explanation of certain phenomena
which had a much deeper source. Now, with the Pact having
been dissolved and the demise of communism, this question has
disappeared from the agenda. And, as I have pointed out in the
past, the independence of a Judge is a quality of his personality.
Lack of it is an accusation that can be raised against an individual whatever his nationality. For the existence of Judges who are
politically biased, or even corrupt, is not a feature of one State
or of one political system only; one may find them everywhere.
To quote Justice Frankfurter, "[Bjy working together, by sharing in a common effort, men of different minds and tempers
reach agreement, acquire understanding and thereby tolerance
of their differences. ' 54 The situation in the International Court
of Justice is perhaps more complex, for it brings together men of
different races, cultures and philosophies. They have to find a
common intellectual language, though it is true that the universality of the discipline in which all of them are versed aids them
greatly in that quest. No seat on the bench should be occupied
by a man who is not worthy of it. And that worth is to be estimated in terms of character and competence, irrespective of
color, religion, or primitive prejudices concerning the conditioning power of nationality. The proper implementation of Articles
2 and 9 of the Court's Statute offers a good solution for the
problems which may arise in the process of selecting members of
the International Court of Justice.

"' Cf. concurring opinion in the famous Little Rock School case, Cooper v. Aaron, 78
S. Ct. 1401 (1958).
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